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At her removal hearing, Afi Marie Apouviepseakoda testified 
about the day when soldiers came to her house in Togo, looking for 
her husband.1 Through an interpreter, she told the Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) about how soldiers ransacked her home, searched the place, and 
confiscated personal documents and photos of her husband.2 They 
were looking for her husband.3 And when Afi Marie could not tell the 
soldiers where her husband was, the soldiers beat Afi Marie with their 
fists and their batons for thirty minutes.4 The blows put her into a 
hospital for ten days and made her brain swell. 5 
Afterwards, Afi Marie recovered from her wounds, left the 
hospital, and took her children to her mother's home in a different part 
of Togo.6 From there, Afi Marie and her children fled to neighboring 
Ghana and then to the United States.7 After six months in the States, 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.  




5 Id. at 895 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
6 Id. at 884 (majority opinion). 
7 Id. 
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Afi Marie returned to Togo. Alone.8 She went to secure money and to 
find her husband, whom she believed was in hiding in Ghana.9 
Afi Marie's husband was a businessman in Togo.10 He was friends 
with the mayor and held city contracts in waste disposal.11 He first 
went into hiding when the mayor of Lome, the capital of Togo, had 
been arrested and jailed.12 The mayor was a member of the opposition 
political party, and the government became interested in Afi Marie's 
husband because he was a known supporter and friend of the mayor.13 
When he learned that the government was sending soldiers after him, 
Afi Marie's husband fled.14  
When Afi Marie went to look for her husband, she was able to 
enter Togo with the help of a friend who was a lieutenant in the 
army.15 Upon her arrival into Togo, a warrant was issued for Afi 
Marie's arrest.16 Six days later, a second warrant for her arrest was 
issued.17 Three days after that, a summons was issued requiring Afi 
Marie's appearance before the police.18  
During that time, Afi Marie stayed at her mother's house.19 She 
was able to raise some money for herself and her children, but she was 
not able to find any information on the whereabouts or well-being of 
her husband.20 Afi Marie once again enlisted the help of her friend in 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 




14 Id. at 883. 





20 Id.  
2
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the military to help her back out of the country.21 She returned to the 
United States, this time to Chicago, where she sought asylum.22  
This is the story that Afi Marie began to tell during her removal 
hearing. But before she could get very far in this explanation, the IJ 
told her: 
 
[Y]ou have to speak up so I can hear your voice. Today 
passiveness and demureness is not the regiment [sic] of 
the day. Today aggressiveness and loudness is [sic] the 
regiment [sic] of the day and you can even scream at 
the Court. I will not take offense to that, but I want to 
hear your voice. So, if you force me repeatedly to ask 
you to raise your voice I will not be pleased. And also 
might indicate the posture of your case as well. If 
you’re really strong in your convictions you’ll express 
it in a strong manner. If your answers are weak the 
Court may believe that you’re [sic] claim is also weak 
so conduct yourself accordingly.23 
 
Then, at the end of her hearing, the IJ denied Afi Marie’s asylum 
application on the basis of an adverse credibility determination.24 The 
IJ held that Afi Marie was simply not believable.25 
Central to asylum law is the simple premise that a refugee's 
testimony, in and of itself, can be enough to show eligibility.26 The 
rationale is based upon the fact that refugees come from places where 
documentation is difficult to obtain, where governments are corrupt or 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 897 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting IJ’s statement during the asylum 
hearing). 
24 Id. at 884 (majority opinion). 
25 See Id. 
26 See Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 969 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 
208.13(a) (2007)).  
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ineffective, and where the refugee's life is in immediate peril.27 Under 
such circumstances, it is simply illogical to require, in addition to 
escaping with one's life, that the refugee also escape with 
incontrovertible documentary proof.  
In a perfect world, we would be able to take the asylum applicants 
at their word, and we would not have to worry about credibility. But 
taking the applicants at their word is difficult. The benefits of asylum 
are numerous, 28 and this creates a substantial incentive to lie.29 
Sitting as the gatekeeper to asylum is the Immigration Judge. The 
IJ is tasked with serving the traditional role of the judge in an 
adversarial proceeding.30 The IJ is also responsible for ensuring that 
the record is fully developed for each asylum applicant.31  
Although this dual role may benefit the applicant, it also creates a 
potential problem. IJs are only human, and might exhibit bias against 
the asylum applicant. In a traditional jury trial, bias might not be 
problematic, as the trial judge’s ability to participate is limited. 
However, because the IJ is acting as both fact-finder and advocate, the 
risk that bias may compromise a decision is magnified. This note will 
argue that, where the IJ makes an adverse credibility determination, 
                                                 
27 “Indeed, we frequently have acknowledged that it is unreasonable to expect 
asylum applicants to procure corroborating documents when official records are ‘in 
disarray,’ either because of war, revolution or simply lack of institutional regularity.” 
Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 387 (7th Cir. 2004).  
28 8 U.S.C. §1158(c)(1) (2006) states: 
In the case of an alien granted asylum under subsection (b) of this 
section, the Attorney General 
(A) shall not remove or return the alien to the alien's country of 
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, the 
country of the alien's last habitual residence; 
(B) shall authorize the alien to engage in employment in the United 
States and provide the alien with appropriate endorsement of that 
authorization; and 
(C) may allow the alien to travel abroad with the prior consent of 
the Attorney General. 
29 See Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 892. 
30 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(1) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §1240.1(c) (2007). 
31 See 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(1). 
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courts should apply a contamination theory that calls for remand 
where the IJ exhibits bias.  
In Part I, I will discuss the critical role of the Immigration Judge 
in asylum proceedings. In Part II, I will discuss the case of 
Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales. In Part III, I will discuss how a 
contamination theory of IJ bias will better achieve the goals of asylum 
law.  
 
I. IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND THE ASYLUM PROCESS 
 
The realities of removal hearings make it difficult to determine 
whether an asylum applicant satisfies these requirements of past 
persecution or reasonable fear of future persecution. Asylum 
applicants almost always need the aid of an interpreter. They will 
frequently be unable to obtain direct documentary proof.32 
Furthermore, asylum applicants frequently arrive from countries with 
customs and cultures that are very different from what the IJs will be 
familiar with.33 This is what the IJ must deal with on a daily basis. 
 
A. The role of the IJ 
 
For the most part, the IJ functions as any other judge.34 The IJ 
directs discovery, hears motions, conducts case management, and 
controls the removal hearing.35 However, in the immigration court 
system, the IJ takes on responsibilities that are permissible because of 
the fact that it is an administrative court. The IJ is also charged with 
ensuring that the parties can fully develop the record.36 An IJ may 
                                                 
32 Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1085 (7th Cir. 2004) (“direct 
authentication or verification of an alien’s testimony and/or evidence is typically 
very difficult and often impossible”). 
33 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d 897 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
34 8 C.F.R. §1240.1(c).  
35 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(1). 
36 Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Hasanaj v. 
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 701 (7th Cir. 2004), for the proposition that the IJ has an 
obligation to establish the record). 
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question a witness, and it does not necessarily matter if the IJ asks 
more questions than either party’s counsel.37 The IJ need only avoid 
exhibiting "impatience, hostility, or a predisposition" against the 
asylum applicant.38 In addition, the IJ can bar evidence or testimony if 
it would be irrelevant, unreliable, duplicative, or otherwise a waste of 
judicial time.39 The only limit to this discretion is that the judge should 
not bar whole chunks of the applicant's case.40 
 
B. Asylum: An Overview 
 
To be eligible for asylum, the applicant must be a refugee.41 As 
defined by statute, a refugee is one who is unable or unwilling to 
return to their country due to persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution.42 Persecution is described as actions that are distinguished 
from mere harassment, even if such harassment would be unfair, 
unjust, unlawful, or unconstitutional.43 To show that she has been 
persecuted, an applicant must show that she has suffered harm such as, 
“detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal 
searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture” 
inflicted for political or religious reasons.44 
                                                 
37 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 887. 
38 Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 945,948 (7th Cir. 2005). 
39 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 887. 
40 Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2003). 
41 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l) (2006). 
42 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
43 Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2005). 
44 Id. (quoting Toptchev v. I.N.S., 295 F.3d 714,720 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotations omitted)). Many of the asylum cases that reach the Seventh Circuit 
require the court to place the harm that the asylum applicant suffers on a point on 
that persecution spectrum. This has lead to what seems to be comparison of evils in 
terms of what degree of harm inflicted that it will take to be granted asylum. For 
example, in reversing an IJ’s determination that the harm suffered did not rise to the 
level of persecution, the court in Tchemkou v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 785, 791-792 (7th 
Cir. 2007) cited the following examples: 
See, e.g., Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(reversing agency finding of no persecution where petitioner had 
6
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In the alternative, an applicant can obtain asylum where she can 
show a well-founded fear of persecution.45 In such a case, the asylum 
applicant needs to  show that her fear of future persecution is 
subjectively and objectively reasonable.46 The subjective component is 
satisfied via credibility determination that the applicant possesses 
actual fear.47 The objective component is satisfied by showing 
“credible, direct and specific evidence in the record of facts that would 
support a reasonable fear that the petitioner faces persecution.”48  
If the asylum applicant’s claim is rejected, the asylum applicant 
may appeal to another administrative court, the applicant may make 
file a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider.49 Motions to reopen 
are will be granted where the asylum applicant is aware of new 
material facts or evidence that was not reasonably available at the time 
                                                                                                                   
been beaten, had his home invaded and had been threatened, and 
noting that “[t]here is no requirement ... that a person must endure 
repeated beatings and physical torment in order to establish past 
persecution”); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 737 (7th Cir. 
2005) (holding that imprisonment for two weeks, during which 
time petitioner was beaten, denied adequate food and water, and 
had salt rubbed in his wounds, constituted past persecution); 
Vaduva v. INS, 131 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “the 
Board reasonably concluded Vaduva ... suffered at least one 
instance of political persecution” when “he was beaten up (he was 
punched, his face bruised, and his finger broken) by strangers who 
told him to stay away from the pro-democratic forces in the 
country”). 
Tchemkou, 495 F.3d at 791-792. 
45 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. 
1208.16(b)(2) (2007). 
46 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,430-31 (1987); Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 
F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir 2004). 
47 Liu, 380 F.3d at 313. 
48 Id. (quoting Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations 
omitted)). 
49 8 C.F.R. §1003.23(b)(1) (2007). 
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of the initial removal hearing.50 Motions to reconsider will be granted 
where the IJ has made errors of law or fact.51  
The denied asylum applicant may also file an appeal of the IJ’s 
decision with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).52 Asylum 
applicants may appeal to these three-member panels as a matter of 
right.53 If the BIA affirms the IJ’s denial, the asylum applicant then can 
take her appeal outside of the administrative system by filing a petition 
for review in the relevant Circuit Court of Appeals.54 
 
C. IJ Bias 
 
On appeal, IJ bias can be attacked in two ways. First, where the 
application is denied on the merits of the claim, the applicant may 
challenge the IJ’s behavior as denying due process.55 Aliens must be 
given “a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against the 
alien, to present evidence on the alien's own behalf, and to cross-
examine witnesses presented by the Government.”56A petition for 
review may be granted where the applicant is denied a “full and fair 
opportunity to put on [their] case.”57 Ultimately, the question is 
whether the asylum applicant had a full and fair opportunity to present 
her case.58 Similarly, if by asking questions to the applicant, an IJ 
                                                 
50 Id. at (b)(3). 
51 Id. at (b)(2). 
52 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a) (2007). 
53 See id.; 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(a)(3) (2007). 
54 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1), (b)(2) (2006). 
55 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Floroiu v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 
970, 973 (7th Cir. 2007). 
56 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(4)(B) (2006). 
57 Floriou, 481 F.3d at 974 (quoting Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 548 (7th 
Cir. 2006)). 
58 Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529, 538 (7th Cir. 2005). 
8
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begins to act as if the IJ were an attorney for the government, the 
petition for review should be granted.59 
Second, if the IJ denies the application on the basis of an adverse 
credibility determination, the asylum applicant can challenge IJ bias 
by challenging the adverse credibility determination itself. In making 
an adverse credibility determination, the IJ may rely upon 
inconsistencies between documents in the record or the testimony of 
the asylum applicant.60 However, to support an adverse credibility 
determination, an inconsistency in the testimony must be substantial, 
and it must constitute a linchpin of the asylum claim.61  
The adverse credibility determination is not necessarily fatal to an 
asylum applicant’s claim. An applicant can rehabilitate her claims by 
providing corroborating evidence.62 However, because documentary 
evidence may simply not be available for certain types of injuries or 
from certain countries, the IJ must explain why it would be reasonable 
to expect the corroborating evidence before the IJ can penalize the 
applicant for failing to provide it.63 Thus, if the asylum applicant is 
unable to produce the required corroborating evidence, the IJ must 
allow the asylum applicant to explain that failure.64 Where the IJ does 
not accept the applicant's explanation, the IJ must state a specific 






                                                 
59 Id. at 538-39. See Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2007) (“An 
immigration judge has a responsibility to function as a neutral, impartial arbiter and 
must refrain from taking on the role of advocate for either party.”). 
60 Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 382-83 (7th Cir. 2004).. 
61 See id. at 383-384.  
62 Gontcharova v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2004). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 877. 
65 Id. 
9
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II. APOUVIEPSEAKODA V. GONZALES 
 
The IJ denied Afi Marie's request for asylum and ordered Afi 
Marie removed to Togo.66 The BIA summarily affirmed the decision.67 
Afi Marie filed her petition for review with the Seventh Circuit. 
 
A. The Immigration Court  
 
In addition to her testimony, Afi Marie brought a medical 
certificate issued at the time of her hospitalization, as well as some 
photos that were taken at the hospital.68 Other documents submitted 
included two arrests warrants issued against Afi Marie by the Togolese 
government; her membership card to the opposition party; letters from 
the opposition party’s First Vice President, her father, and her cousins; 
and country reports issued by the State Department and Amnesty 
International.69 She also brought two witnesses: her daughter and a 
family friend who had fled Togo in 1996.70  
Nevertheless, the IJ made an adverse credibility determination 
against Afi Marie at the end of her removal hearing and found that her 
proffered documentary evidence did not sufficiently corroborate her 
claims.71 The IJ did not reach the merits of Afi Marie’s claims and did 
not analyze whether Afi Marie would have qualified for asylum if her 
story were believable. 
 
                                                 
66 Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2007). 
67 Id. at 883. 
68 Id. at 890. 
69 Decision of the Immigration Judge at 3, In the Matter of Afi Marie 
Apouviepseakoda, Immigration Court, Chicago, Illinois, (June 14, 2004) (File: A78-
863-025), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, search for case 
No. 05-3752, follow “05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_002.pdf” link). 
70 Brief of Petitioner at 20, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (No. 05-3752), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, 
search for case No. 05-3752, follow “05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_001.pdf” 
link). 
71 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 884. 
10
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1. Adverse credibility determination 
 
The IJ began by identifying six bases upon which he found Afi 
Marie’s testimony to be unbelievable.72 First, he found her explanation 
as to why she was being targeted to be “vague and unconvincing.”73 
The IJ noted that Afi Marie claimed that the Togolese government was 
targeting her family because of her husband.74 Given that her husband 
was not directly supporting the opposition party but was merely 
supporting the mayor, who happened to be a member of the opposition 
party, the IJ thought that this was a tenuous basis for the government 
to target her and her family.75   
This tenuousness continued to be a concern in the second basis for 
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Surely, if Afi Marie truly 
were a card-carrying member of the opposition party, 76 the soldiers 
who came to her home would have taken her documents too, in 
addition to her husband’s. 77 
The third basis for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was 
his disbelief that Afi Marie was hospitalized for ten days.78 The 
medical certificate seemed to have inconsistent dates on it. Although it 
was dated on September 18, 2001, the document’s text indicated that 
Afi Marie would be discharged on the 28th.79 To the IJ, this indicated 
that the document seemed to know the future.80 In addition, the 
document was signed by “Dr. Theophile Fonkoue, M.D., Gynecology-
                                                 
72 Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 69, at 8-10. 
73 Id. at 8. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 11. 
77 Id. at 8. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 8-9. 
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Obstetrics-General Medicine.”81 The IJ found it inconsistent that Afi 
Marie would see a gynecologist, if she had actually been beaten. 82  
The IJ next turned his attention to the photographs that Afi Marie 
had submitted.83 These photographs were taken by Afi Marie’s cousin, 
and they depicted Afi Marie in a medical facility.84 However, in the 
pictures, it did not look like Afi Marie had been beaten at all.85 Afi 
Marie’s face and arms did not seem to have any bruises or bandages 
on them, which the IJ presumably anticipated would have been there if 
Afi Marie had actually been beaten by soldiers for thirty minutes.86 In 
addition, most of Afi Marie’s body was covered in those pictures.87 Afi 
Marie was wearing a scarf covering her head, so any injuries that 
would have been visible on her head were not depicted in the 
pictures.88 
The lack of visible injuries in the pictures only exacerbated an 
additional problem that the IJ saw with the photographs – they seemed 
to be dated incorrectly.89 They were all marked with what appeared to 
be a stamp of “03 4 16.”90 The IJ saw that this too was an 
inconsistency in Afi Marie’s testimony.91 She testified that she was 
beaten in 2001, but the photos that she submitted as proof of the 
resulting hospitalization did not seem to have been taken until 2003.92 
The IJ reasoned that, if the photos were not taken during the 
                                                 









90 Id. at 5, note 11. 
91 Id. at 9. 
92 Id.  
12
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hospitalization as Afi Marie had claimed they were, this cast doubt 
onto whether Afi Marie was ever hospitalized at all.93 
Fourth, the IJ questioned the fact that Afi Marie was able to travel 
safely back to Togo without being harmed or arrested. Typically, the 
concern with applicants who are able to return to the country they fled 
is that, if they were willing to return voluntarily, then the conditions 
they had previously fled might not have been that bad after all.94 
Indeed, other cases have laid out this concern more explicitly.95 And in 
these cases, the conclusion drawn from the ability of a asylum 
applicant to return to safely travel to and from their home country, 
even if temporarily, is that the people who were persecuting the 
applicants either have lost interest in exacting further persecution or 
the harms that were previously inflicted were not that bad after all.96  
The IJ in Apouviepseakoda was no exception, as the IJ expressed 
incredulity at the fact that Afi Marie was able to travel into and out of 
the country, despite the fact that warrants had been issued for her 
arrest.97 Afi Marie explained that she was able to do so with the help 
of a friend in the army.98 The IJ rejected this explanation in two parts. 
First, he noted that, although Afi Marie mentioned her return to Togo 
in her asylum application, this assistance of her military friend was 
omitted in her asylum application.99 But what really stood out to the IJ 
was the fact that Afi Marie took the time to go to the hospital.100 And 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 See Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 606-607 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating 
that, “We have recognized before that the absence of any evidence of harm to family  
members undermines an applicant’s claim of a fear of future persecution.”). 
95 Recently, the Seventh Circuit stated in a non-precedential decision: “The 
fact that [the asylum applicant] has returned to [to her home country] several times 
since her encounter, and that both her family members and those of her husband still 
live there peacefully, undercuts her claim to fear returning.” Pupella v. Gonzales, 
207 Fed.Appx. 683, 686 (7th Cir. 2006). 
96 See id. 
97 Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 891 (7th Cir. 2007). 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
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what's more, she went to the very same hospital in her hometown that 
had treated her for her post-beating injuries.101 Presumably, if Afi 
Marie really did fear persecution, she would have avoided the places 
that authorities would know to look for her. 
Fifth, the IJ found a testimonial inconsistency as to the 
whereabouts of her husband.102 She testified that her husband came to 
the United States on August 20, 2002, and the affidavit of a friend 
indicated that her husband was living with her in the States.103 
However, her asylum application, which was submitted on August 22, 
2002, stated that she had no idea where he was.104  
Finally, the IJ found another consistency in the testimony that Afi 
Marie’s husband returned to Togo from neighboring Ghana to try and 
sell the radio station that he owned.105 The problem that the IJ had 
with this testimony is similar to the problem he had with Afi Marie’s 
ability to return to Togo.106 If Afi Marie, or her husband, was willing 
to go back to Togo for something as mundane as selling a radio 
station, then maybe the risks appurtenant were not all that bad.107 
 
2. Corroborative evidence 
 
Having made the adverse credibility determination, the IJ then 
evaluated whether any of the documentary evidence rehabilitated Afi 
Marie’s claim.108 The IJ began his analysis by evaluating the submitted 
photographs and medical record for a second time, again stating that 
the photos did not prove any injuries and seemed to be taken after the 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Decision of the Immigration Judge at 9-10, In the Matter of Afi Marie 
Apouviepseakoda, Immigration Court, Chicago, Illinois, (June 14, 2004) (File: A78-
863-025), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, search for case 
No. 05-3752, follow “05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_002.pdf” link). 
103 Id. at 10-11. 
104 Id. 
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dates Afi Marie claimed injury.109 On the second time around however, 
the IJ attributed another fault to the medical certificate, this time 
noting that it was suspicious that the document was signed by a 
consulting doctor.110 
The IJ then evaluated other forms of corroborating evidence, none 
of which was sufficient to rehabilitate Afi Marie’s credibility.111 First, 
Afi Marie submitted two warrants issued by the Togolese government 
for her arrest.112 The IJ found the arrest warrants for Afi Marie issued 
by the Togolese government to be suspect because one of the warrants 
referred to Afi Marie as a “Mme” and the other referred to her as a 
“Mlle.”113 In addition, one of the arrest warrants was issued after she 
returned to Togo, but it did not seem to affect her ability to leave using 
her own passport.114 
The IJ then proceeded to give similarly brief analysis to the rest of 
Afi Marie’s documents. The IJ did not give any weight to Afi Marie’s 
membership in the opposition political party because, although she 
submitted a membership card, there was no indication on the card that 
Afi Marie was a dues-paying member.115  
Similarly, the IJ declined to give much weight to the letters from 
the opposition political party’s First Vice President because it did not 
mention the fact that Afi Marie was beaten or that Afi Marie’s husband 
had contributed to the party.116 The letter written by her father suffered 
the same shortcoming in the eyes of the IJ.117 It, too, failed to mention 
Afi Marie’s 2001 beating.118 
                                                 
109 Id. at 11. 
110 Id. at 8. 
111 Id. 11-12. 
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The affidavit of a friend who knew Afi Marie’s family in Togo 
was rejected because the affiant had left for the United States prior to 
the events upon which Afi Marie founded her claim.119 The IJ did not 
even bother to discuss the contents of this affidavit. 
Photocopied letters from her cousins in Togo indicated that her 
home had been looted and that the reigning political party was upset 
with her for contacting opposition activists.120 The IJ dismissed these 
letters as exaggerations.121 
Even the Togo country reports issued by the Amnesty 
International and U.S. State Department were not sufficient to help Afi 
Marie.122 They only went so far as to establish that political activists 
might be targeted in Togo. However, they did not establish that Afi 
Marie herself would be targeted.123 
After reviewing the evidence, the IJ found that Afi Marie was not 
credible and that her documentary submissions were not sufficient to 
rehabilitate her credibility.124 The IJ thus denied Afi Marie’s 
application for asylum125 
 
B. Seventh Circuit Majority 
 
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Afi Marie made two arguments. 
First, she argued that the IJ erred in making an adverse credibility 
determination.126 Second, Afi Marie argued that the IJ's conduct during 
                                                 
119 Id. at 11-12. 





125 Id. The IJ also denied Afi Marie’s applications for withholding from 
removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. These forms of relief 
were similarly denied for the same reasons why he denied the asylum claim. Id. at 
12-14. 
126 Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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the removal hearing denied her due process.127 The Seventh Circuit 
rejected both of Afi Marie's arguments.128  
 
1. Due Process Challenge 
 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first looked to Afi Marie's 
argument that IJ bias in her removal hearing denied her due process.129 
The majority noted that “the form of [the IJ's] interruptions were 
occasionally jarring,”130 but this was not enough to warrant remand.131 
In reviewing the IJ's behavior, the Seventh Circuit seemed to ignore 
any transgressions or excesses the IJ may have committed, so long as 
the IJ was not barring testimony or evidence.132 
First, the Seventh Circuit noted that Afi Marie's hearing lasted six 
hours and reasoned that six hours was a strong indication that Afi 
Marie had a reasonable opportunity to present her case.133 Second, 
although the two witnesses who appeared at Afi Marie's hearing did 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 893. 
129 Id. at 884. This type of due process claim seems to be common amongst 
petitioners before the Seventh Circuit. See id. at 885 (citing Rehman v. Gonzales, 
441 F.3d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 2006); Boyanivsky v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 286, 292 (7th 
Cir. 2006); Pornsivakulchai v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2006)). A 
recent trend in the treatment of the due process challenge has been to reclassify these 
arguments as statutory violations instead of constitutional claims: “In other words, 
Apouviepseakoda, like many before her, has made the mistake of employing “flabby 
constitutional arguments to displace more focused contentions,” and is really arguing 
that the IJ’s hearing violated these statutory and regulatory provisions.” 
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 885 (internal citations omitted). However, Seventh 
Circuit panels have been inconsistent in this nomenclature. Although no panel has 
declined review for failure to correctly classify the claim, some panels apply the 
flabby constitutional claim critique while others discuss the issue in terms of due 
process. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit was willing to address Afi Marie’s 
argument as if it were appropriately proposed. Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 884. 
130 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 887. 
131 Id. at 889. 
132 See id. at 888-889. 
133 Id. at 889. 
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not testify, the Seventh Circuit did not think it was a problem because 
the IJ accepted the offer of proof on what their testimony would have 
been.134  
 
2. Adverse Credibility Determination  
 
Having determined that the IJ’s behavior did not have an adverse 
affect on Afi Marie’s case, the majority then evaluated the substance of 
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.135 First, the majority looked 
at the two problems the IJ had with the photos that Afi Marie had 
submitted with her claim.136 The Seventh Circuit joined in the IJ’s 
critique that the photos could not offer evidence of the wounds 
because Afi Marie was wearing a headdress and gown that covered the 
areas she claimed were injured.137 Furthermore, the majority also 
noted parenthetically that, in some of the pictures, Afi Marie appeared 
to be relatively mobile.138  
The IJ and the majority were also troubled by what appeared to be 
a date stamp on all of the photos.139 It is unclear from the record as to 
why, but the originals that were part of Afi Marie’s asylum files were 
not before the IJ.140 Instead, the IJ only had photocopies available, and 
these photocopies made it difficult to read what seemed to be a date 
stamp “03 4 16” on all of the photos.141 On the one hand, if the 03 
stood for 2003, that would mean that the pictures were taken almost 
two years after Afi Marie claimed that the events had transpired in 
2001. But on the other hand, Afi Marie filed her asylum claim in 
                                                 
134 Id. at 888-89. 
135 Id. at 889. 
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2002.142 When asked about the “03 4 16” marking, Afi Marie could 
only offer that she was not in Togo in 2003.143 
The majority decided to address this issue by way of footnote, 
explaining that the pictures may have been submitted even after the 
2002 asylum application because it was not certain that photographs 
were a part of that application:  
 
[T]he application itself does not refer to these 
documents or suggest additional attachments; the 
exhibits offer no stamp to certify their filing with the 
original application; and they do not carry any page 
numbers that would suggest they are part of a package. 
Finally, while some of the documents in these exhibits 
are dated based on when they were translated into 
English, the photos offer no indication of when they 
were placed there.144  
 
The majority took these shortcomings to be sufficient to support the 
IJ’s concerns, reasoning that Afi Marie had simply failed to satisfy her 
burden of explaining away this uncertainty.145  
Second, the Seventh Circuit majority next looked to what has 
often been a fatal fact to many other asylum applicant’s claims.146 The 
Seventh Circuit majority echoed the IJ’s concern regarding Afi Marie’s 
ability to return to Togo by noting that, not only did she return, she 
went back to the same hospital she had last been the last time she 
needed medical attention.147 Furthermore, unlike the first time, the 
majority noted that the condition for which she was risking capture on 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at  890 n.5. 
145 Id. 
146 See Firmanshjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2005); Pupella v. 
Gonzales, 207 Fed.Appx 683 (7th Cir. 2006). 
147 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 891. 
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this second visit was not even a matter of life and death. It was 
gynecological.148  
 
3. Corroborative Evidence 
 
In its review of the IJ’s treatment of Afi Marie’s corroborative 
evidence, the majority rehashes many of the same inconsistencies in 
the documentary evidence that it first propounded in its analysis of Afi 
Marie’s testimony. Although Afi Marie presented several pieces of 
corroborative evidence, the only new analysis the Seventh Circuit 
majority conducts is to review the letter from Afi Marie’s father.149 
Although the Seventh Circuit majority concedes that the letter does 
describe hardships experienced by other members of her family and 
warns Afi Marie to be cautious with whom she speaks with in United 
States regarding Togo, both the IJ and the Seventh Circuit fault the 
letter for not mentioning either Afi Marie’s arrest warrants or her 
earlier beating.150  
 
C. Judge Posner’s Dissent: A Critique in Three Parts 
 
Judge Posner’s dissent in Afi Marie’s case is particularly scathing. 
He begins by identifying the IJ by name in his dissent, adding that this 
is not the first time that the Seventh Circuit has reviewed an allegation 
that this particular IJ exhibited less than decorous behavior in a 
                                                 
148 Id. at 891 n.6 (stating that “This April visit to a gynecologist prompts us to 
note a coincidence not recognized by the IJ.”) (emphasis in original). Afi Marie 
testified that the beating and its subsequent hospitalization occurred in April, 2001. 
Her return to that same Togo hospital also occurred in the month of April – the 
implication being that, on both occasions, Afi Marie was simply visiting her 
gynecologist for her annual exam. Notwithstanding that there was nothing in the 
record to indicate whether Togolese standards in gynecology adopted the American 
standard of care in annual exams, what the Seventh Circuit majority seems to be 
doing is masking a de novo finding of fact by burying it in a footnote.  
149 Id. at 892. 
150 Id. 
20
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 13
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/13
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 430
removal hearing.151 Judge Posner notes that, the last time the Seventh 
Circuit reviewed one of his decisions, the panel was left with “no idea 
why the IJ ruled as he did.”152  
Judge Posner’s dissent takes on three major issues in the majority 
opinion. First, Judge Posner attacks the IJ’s evaluation of Afi Marie’s 
evidence. Second, he addresses the inappropriateness of the IJ’s 
behavior. Third, he then discusses how the problems in this case are 
institutional. 
 
1. On the IJ’s Reasoning 
 
In reviewing the IJ’s decision in Afi Marie’s case, Judge Posner 
addressed each inconsistency that the IJ identified. First, Judge Posner 
notes that it is “often bad news” for the entire family of a person who 
is a member of a political party that opposes a dictator.153 So, the IJ’s 
confusion as to whether Afi Marie was targeted because of her own, 
personal membership in the opposition party or because of her 
husband’s connections to the mayor did not matter to Judge Posner. 
Each basis could independently support an asylum claim.154 
Judge Posner then addressed the IJ’s concerns over why the 
soldiers were ransacking Afi Marie’s house.155 He found particularly 
troubling the IJ’s conclusion that, because Afi Marie could not explain 
why the soldiers did not find and take Afi Marie’s travel documents, 
she must have been lying.156 In response, Judge Posner points out that 
Afi Marie should not  be blamed for her inability to explain the 
                                                 
151 “As is apparent from his opinion and from the transcript of the hearing, the 
immigration judge, O. John Brahos, has, once again, ‘doubted the applicant’s 
credibility on grounds that, because of factual error, bootless speculation, and errors 
of logic, lack a rational basis.’” Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 894 (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Pramatarov v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 764, 765 (7th Cir 2006)). 
152 Id. (quoting Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir.2007)). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. (“[t]his is not an esoteric point, but Judge Brahos overlooked it”). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 894-895. 
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soldier’s actions or omissions.157 After all, she could not possibly 
know what the soldiers were each individually thinking at the time of 
the ransacking. If she had offered any further explanation, it would 
have been pure speculation.158  
Judge Posner next addresses the IJ’s problems with the medical 
certificate that Afi Marie submitted with her asylum claim. Although 
the IJ found it problematic that Afi Marie was treated by a 
gynecologist, Judge Posner quickly points out that the doctor who 
signed the certificate listed his practices as “Gynecology-Obstetrics-
General Medicine.”159 To Judge Posner, this indicated that, not only 
was the doctor a gynecologist, but he also practiced general medicine, 
which would have made the diagnosis the doctor gave within his realm 
of expertise.160  
Additionally, Judge Posner addresses a problem with other 
assumptions of the IJ in regards to the medical certificate. The IJ 
found it troubling that Afi Marie’s medical certificate was signed by a 
consulting physician rather than a treating physician.161 Because a 
treating physician would have had access to information regarding any 
pre-existing conditions, only a treating physician, the IJ reasoned, 
would have noted whether the injuries, if any, were the result of a new 
trauma.162 The IJ then concluded that, because a consulting physician 
would not have had similar access to prior medical history, the medical 
                                                 
157 Id. at 894. 
158 Id. Judge Posner additionally suggests that, since the soldiers weren’t 
looking for her or her children, it makes complete sense that they didn’t care about 
their documents. Id. 
159 Id. at 895. 
160 Id. Afi Marie’s diagnosis was for “chronic insomnia, psychosis, and total 
[illegible] cerebral edema.” Id. However, Judge Posner concedes a “genuine 
anomaly” in the fact that the medical document was signed on September 18th but 
indicated that Afi Marie would be discharged ten days later. Id. But he dismisses this 
anomaly as being no more than a “mistake” that can be found in generally in medical 
records, even in the U.S. Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 896. 
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certificate signed by the consulting physician deserved little weight.163 
Judge Posner addresses this line of reasoning simply: the IJ is not an 
expert in Togolese medicine and his conclusions were based on an 
assumption that medicine is practiced in Togo in the exact same way it 
is practiced in the United States.164 Such “a priori views about how 
authoritarian regimes conduct themselves” are no substitute for 
evidence, Judge Posner said.165 
Judge Posner next addresses the IJ’s treatment of Afi Marie’s 
photos.166 Whereas the IJ was concerned that Afi Marie’s seemed to be 
covered or masked in the photos, Judge Posner notes that women in 
Togo commonly wear headdresses.167 In addition, even if she were not 
wearing a headdress, Judge Posner notes that Afi Marie was diagnosed 
with cerebral edema, a swelling of the brain which simply would not 
be outwardly visible.168 And in case there was any doubt that Afi 
Marie had a head injury, Judge Posner points out that her other two 
diagnoses, chronic insomnia and psychosis are two symptoms a 
cerebral edema.169  
When Judge Posner addresses the date stamp on the photos, he 
notes that whatever the “03 4 16” marking on the photos means, it is 
not a date.170  The numbers could not represent a 2003 photo date 
because the photos were submitted with Afi Marie’s 2002 asylum 
application.171 Furthermore, the numbers could not be the result of a 
                                                 
163 Id. 
164 Id.  
165 Id. (quoting Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2006)). 




170 Id. at 896. 
171 Id.  
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forgery attempt because then they would have had the correct date on 
them.172 
Finally, Judge Posner addresses Afi Marie’s ability to return to 
Togo and then later leave a second time.173 For Judge Posner, because 
Afi Marie was relatively wealthy and, because her husband was still in 
hiding, the desire to return to Togo to retrieve money and to find her 
husband would have been sufficient to overcome any fear that she 
would be harmed on her return.174 Furthermore, because she was able 
to enlist the protection of an officer to escort her through customs, this 
explained to Judge Posner why she was able to enter and then 
subsequently leave the county where there were warrants outstanding 
for Afi Marie’s arrest.175 
 
2. Judge Posner on the IJ’s Behavior 
 
Searching for an explanation as to why the IJ would make such 
seeming lapses in logic, Judge Posner then looks to the transcript.176 
There, he notes some appalling behavior on the part of the IJ.177 When 
Afi Marie began her testimony in a soft voice, the IJ stopped her and 
told her to shout out her testimony, warning, “if you force me 
repeatedly to ask you to raise your voice I will not be pleased”178 
Judge Posner points out that this invitation (“you can even scream at 
the court”179) could not have been motivated by difficulty in hearing. 
180 Afi Marie was speaking through a French interpreter.181 The 
                                                 
172 Judge Posner also notes that the record only provides photocopies of the 
photographs. And he notes that it would have been the Department of Homeland 




176 Id. at 897. 
177 Id. 
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interpreter had no problems hearing Afi Marie.182 And the IJ did not 
seem to have any problems hearing the interpreter.183 
Another reason why the IJ asked Afi Marie to speak loudly was 
because he felt that it “also might indicate the posture of [Afi Marie’s] 
case as well.”184 Apparently, the IJ presumed some sort of positive 
correlation between the loudness of testimony and its truthfulness – to 
which Judge Posner notes, “I have never before heard it suggested that 
truthfulness can be inferred from a witness’s decibel level.”185 
Had the IJ’s behavior simply remained unorthodox, that might not 
have warranted criticism. However, this unorthodoxy turned into 
hostility, which Judge Posner additionally commented upon. The IJ 
asked for proof that Afi Marie’s husband owned a radio station, and 
she was able to provide a photograph of her husband at the radio 
station.186 In response, he stated, “I have photographs also in high 
school where I took pictures with a radio transmitter there. Does that 
mean that that is an operating business because you have a 
photograph?”187 And lest there be any confusion as to what the IJ was 
specifically looking for, the IJ clarified that he was looking for 
evidence in the record “from the listeners to verify that they heard the 
station.”188 
Judge Posner also noted two problems with the way the IJ treated 
Afi Marie’s testimony about her husband’s garbage collection 
business. The IJ wanted more information about the nature of the 




184 Id. (quoting the IJ as explaining, “If you’re really strong in your convictions 
you’ll express it in a strong manner. If your answers are weak the Court may believe 
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collection business, to which Afi Marie admitted that she could not 
provide much help.189 But the IJ just would not let it go: 
 
Q: A spouse does not know what her husband is doing 
when he’s working, is that what you wish me to 
believe? 
A: Yes. In Africa, it is very difficult for a woman to be 
involved in her husband’s business. 
Q: So, when he goes to work in the morning you don’t 
know where he’s going, is that what you’re saying? 
He doesn’t tell you. 
A: He tells me that he goes to work but I don’t follow 
him to see where he, he’s would go. 
Q: That’s amazing. 
Q: (to the interpreter) You want to tell her that’s 
amazing. You want to tell her.190 
 
To his credit, the IJ eventually did let Afi Marie know what type of 
evidence he was looking for.191 He explained that he was looking for 
statements from former employees of Afi Marie’s husband that would 
verify their employment.192 To which Judge Posner replied, “does 
Judge Brahos really expect garbage men in Togo to provide affidavits 
concerning their former employer, now an enemy of the state?”193 
Based upon these exchanges, Judge Posner believes that the 
deference normally afforded to an IJ’s adverse credibility 
determination should not apply.194 Typically, such deference derives 
from being able to observe the demeanor of a witness who testifies.195 
The majority relies heavily on this point, stating that it was the IJ and 
                                                 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 898. 
191 Id. at 897. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 893-894. 
195 Id. at 897. 
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not the appellate court that spent six hours with Afi Marie.196 Judge 
Posner responds, however, that the deference should not apply where 
the underlying rationale is absent.197 Because of the fact that the IJ had 
to listen to the testimony through an interpreter and had to observe the 
mannerisms of a person from another culture, Judge Posner doubts 
that mere observation gives an IJ any more of an ability to filter for the 
truth.198 
 
3. Judge Posner on the Problems with the Immigration Court System 
in General 
 
As scathing and thorough as Judge Posner’s dissent was, he 
ultimately signals that the shortcomings in the handling of Afi Marie’s 
case are institutional rather than individual.199 He cites the Herculean 
task ascribed to IJs, noting the horrendous workloads, the typical lack 
of reliable evidence, the generally poor conditions from which the 
asylum applicants arrive, and the overall unfamiliarity of Americans 
with those foreign countries and cultures.200 
Judge Posner personally, along with other judges from several 
circuit courts of appeal, has criticized the immigration system as 
necessarily engendering bad decisions.201 Here, Judge Posner once 
                                                 
196 Id. at 893 (majority opinion). 
197 Id. at 897 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 898. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 886 n.2 (majority opinion): 
The system is in turmoil as the nation’s immigration judges (218 at last 
count) struggle to complete some 350,000 cases a year, all without law 
clerks, bailiffs, stenographers, and often competent lawyers and 
interpreters. Often, immigration judges are hearing three contested 
hearings a day and up to 15 in a week. As Judge John M. Walker, Jr., of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, told the Senate 
Judiciary Committee last April, “I fail to see how immigration judges can 
be expected to make thorough and competent findings of fact and 
conclusions of law under these circumstances.” 
Id.  
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again faults both Congress and the Justice Department for failing to 
correct at least those conditions over which it has control.202 
Ultimately, however, as morally forgivable as Judge Posner finds the 
actions of the IJ in this case, he reasons that the behavior was still 
legally deficient.203 Therefore, he dissents, stating, “The immigration 
judge’s opinion is pervaded by gross errors of fact and logic, and read 
in light of the hearing transcript is an embarrassment to American 
justice.”204 
 
III. IJ BIAS: THE CONTAMINATION THEORY 
 
Courts have had a difficult time figuring out quite how to address 
the various arguments raised on appeal where there is both IJ bias and 
an adverse credibility determination involved. The following section 
will first discuss the shortcomings in the current scheme. Then, this 
section will discuss the benefits of applying a contamination theory in 
adverse credibility determination cases. Finally, this section will 
conclude with a discussion of how the contamination theory would 
apply in Afi Marie’s case. 
 
A. The Existing Standards are Inadequate 
 
The problem with the due process challenge is that it is too 
narrow and only detects the most egregious cases of IJ bias. The 
Seventh Circuit’s approach to due process challenges based on IJ bias, 
and that of many other circuits, requires actual prejudice.205 Only in 
                                                 
202 Id. at 898 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 See, e.g., Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(declining to find a due process violation even though  IJ exhibited “a lack of 
courtesy and the absence of the expected level of professionalism.”); Elias v. 
Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (“we are especially troubled by the 
conduct of the IJ during the hearing and its effect on the petitioner’s ability to testify 
accurately.”); e.g., Ciroba v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that IJ’s initial assessment of the evidence “without more, do[es] not establish bias 
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the most flagrant of circumstances does improper IJ behavior 
constitute reversible error.206 Otherwise, the applicant must show that 
they suffered a physical or procedural inability to testify. A physical 
inability occurs when harsh or over-zealous cross-examination frazzles 
the witness, making it difficult for the witness to continue testifying.207 
A procedural inability occurs when an IJ’s actions bars critical 
testimony or evidence.208  
This standard overlooks the possibility that there are cases where 
the bias of the IJ, albeit falling short of the due process violation 
standard, has incorrectly denied benefits to a deserving applicant. 
Assume that two asylum applicants with identical histories of actual 
persecution face the same, biased IJ. If one asylum applicant breaks 
down in tears in response to inappropriate IJ behavior, and if the other 
asylum applicant merely withdraws into silence, this would lead to an 
odd result upon review of the adverse credibility determination. 
Because of the prejudice requirement, the same behavior of the IJ 
could produce different results for the similarly situated asylum 
applicants who faced similar IJ bias. The petitioner who broke down in 
tears would have shown actual prejudice, warranting remand. The 
petitioner who simply remained silent under the same inappropriate IJ 
behavior would not be able to show prejudice – she would not be 
entitled to a new hearing. Thus, because it could produce different 
results between two identically situated asylum applicants, a prejudice 
requirement is inappropriate in the review of adverse credibility 
determinations. 
                                                                                                                   
on the part of the IJ.”); Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(requiring a showing that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected). 
206 For example, in Floriou v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2007), 
where the Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review where the IJ blamed the 
asylum applicants themselves for being persecuted. Id. The IJ called the asylum 
applicants “zealots” and concluded that they were harmed only because they 
provoked their attackers with their religious beliefs. Id.  
207 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 885-886 (majority opinion) (quoting Giday 
v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
208 Id. (quoting Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
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There are instances, however, where the requirement of actual 
prejudice is desirable. If an IJ has found an applicant to be credible but 
has denied the application on the merits, remand for a new hearing 
may not be necessary. In that situation, the IJ takes the asylum 
applicant’s claims as true. The only challenge would be whether the 
facts, as the applicant portrays them, qualify the applicant for asylum. 
The denied but credible applicant would factually have nothing new to 
add. This challenge on the merits is adequately addressed by the 
existing standards of review. 
However, where the rejection is based on an adverse credibility 
determination, courts should apply a contamination standard. Once it 
is determined that the IJ has crossed that line into IJ bias, this should 
constitute reversible error. Where the IJ has exhibited an inability to 
remain impartial in making subjective evaluations such as is required 
in gauging truthfulness, such subjective evaluations should not be 
given much weight.  
 
B. The Contamination Theory Better Achieves the Goals of Asylum 
Law 
 
What is unique to the immigration systems is the extent to which 
bias is tolerated. In a state or federal court, potential jurors may be 
excused for cause, or they may be excused through a peremptory 
challenge.209 Judges in jury trial or a bench trial may excuse 
themselves if their participation would be biased or would harbor even 
the appearance of bias.210 Removing bias from the courtroom is 
necessary to the accuracy of the fact-finder’s result. Similarly, in the 
immigration context, we should demand impartiality from the IJ, 
particularly when the IJ makes as subjective a determination as 
truthfulness.  
Applying a contamination theory to inappropriate IJ behavior 
better achieves the goals of asylum law because of the intermediate 
standard it provides. When reviewing an adverse credibility 
                                                 
209 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006); 725 ILCS 5/115-4(d). 
210 28 U.S.C. §144 (2006). 
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determination, even bias that does not reach the level of a due process 
violation should be considered grounds for granting a petition for 
review. The IJ is unique in that the IJ is called upon to make findings 
in a system that cannot avail itself to the normal barometers of 
truthfulness. As Judge Posner’s dissent noted, the ability to observe the 
witness testify is of lesser value when the asylum applicant testifies 
through an interpreter and brings to the stand the cultural mannerisms 
of the unfamiliar country from which she came.211 Where the IJ has 
very little corroborative documentary evidence to go on and must 
make decisions on whether an asylum applicant is telling the truth, we 
should demand the highest degree of impartiality and tolerate the least 
amount of bias. Where the IJ shows bias, it not only “demeans the 
witness,”212 but this also affects the IJ’s ability to appropriately weigh 
the evidence.  
Yet, except in the most extreme cases,213 IJ bias does not 
constitute a factor in whether the IJ’s decision was an abuse of 
discretion. For example, in Afi Marie’s case, the Seventh Circuit 
majority examined the due process argument first and then separately 
analyzed the challenge to the adverse credibility determination.214 This 
has the effect of insulating IJ bias from detection. On review, even a 
biased credibility determination will be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion. 
The unacceptability of this result is highlighted when placed up 
against the rationales for why IJs are even allowed such a degree of 
                                                 
211 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 897 (Posner, J., dissenting) 
212 Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006) (granting petition for 
review where IJ argued with and intimidated asylum applicant). 
213 Recently, the Seventh Circuit joined the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits in recognizing that there are instances where the effect of IJ bias is palpable 
from the cold record alone. Foriou v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir, 2007). 
Those cases do not preempt the need for a contamination theory of IJ bias. In each of 
those cases, the petition for review could have been granted on other bases, such as 
through a challenge of the adverse credibility determination or through the due 
process analysis. If IJ bias is to serve as a basis for remand, it should be construed to 
have its own distinct purpose. 
214 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 884 (majority opinion). 
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participation in the first place. The presumption supporting the ability 
of the IJ to depart from a judge’s normally hands-off role is that, 
without such interference by the IJ, the asylum applicant, who is 
unfamiliar with the English language and American legal system, 
would be unable to sufficiently plead their case for asylum.215 And so 
to avoid this injustice, and so as to ensure that we grant asylum to 
those who deserve it, we allow the IJs to step in and develop the 
record more fully. However, where the policy concerns that permit the 
IJ to interfere are absent, tolerance of IJ participation should decrease.  
Thus, where the asylum applicant is represented by an attorney, 
the IJ should not be as intrusive as the IJ might be if the asylum 
applicant were proceeding pro se. If the asylum applicant is 
represented, and if the government’s interests are similarly represented 
by counsel, the rationale for departing from the traditional adversarial 
system disappears. Yet, there is no rule against IJ participation, even 
where all parties are represented by counsel.  
The regulations provide that the IJ may perform a direct 
examination, a cross examination, or otherwise participate in order to 
fully develop the record.216 However, the trend has been for IJs to take 
this privilege one step further. Rarely do IJs help elicit favorable 
testimony. Instead, they more often try to debunk the asylum 
applicant’s claims.217 While there is no regulatory bar against pressing 
an asylum applicant to find the truth, there needs to be something 
more than the due process consideration to prevent the IJ from 
                                                 
215 See Hasanaj v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2004) (agreeing with 
the government’s contention during oral argument that “the fact that an IJ asks 
questions during the proceedings is helpful to develop the record and is better than a 
silent bench that says nothing throughout the proceedings and then denies the request 
for asylum because the petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence”). 
216 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2006). 
217 E.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing 
various cases within the Seventh Circuit where IJs were hostile, abusive, biased, or 
skewed with prejudgment). See also Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir 
2003) (discussing cases where IJ has “behaved not as a neutral fact-finder interested 
in hearing the petitioner’s evidence, but as a partisan adjudicator seeking to 
intimidate the [alien] and his counsel.”). 
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becoming a second Attorney General working against the asylum 
applicant. 
 
C. Applying the Theory to Afi Marie’s Case 
 
Creating a rule to detect IJ bias will necessarily be multi-factored, 
and it will also necessarily require a case-by-case development of IJ 
contamination law. But that doesn’t mean that Courts would be 
without guidance. To determine whether an IJ was biased, courts 
should look to the same factors that IJs use for making adverse 
credibility determinations: demeanor, internal inconsistency, 




As a factor in the contamination analysis, courts should view 
combative demeanor as circumstantial evidence of pre-decision. In 
examining the IJ’s demeanor for bias, courts should compare the IJ’s 
behavior with what would normally be expected of a judge. Where the 
IJ fails to show the “patience and dignity befitting a person privileged 
to exercise judicial authority,”218 courts should construe the IJ’s 
demeanor as circumstantial evidence of a compromised decision-
making ability. 
In Afi Marie’s case, Judge Posner found the IJ’s performance in 
Afi Marie’s case to be “appalling.”219 To conclude, he went so far as to 
call the IJ’s decision as “an embarrassment to American justice.”220 
Even the majority conceded that the IJ’s behavior was “hardly a model 
of patience and decorum.”221 The majority further described the IJ’s 
behavior as “unseemly,”222 “mocking,”223 “demonstrat[ing] 
                                                 
218 See Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006),  
219 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 898 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
220 Id. 
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intemperance,”224 and “jarring.”225 Under either the majority’s or the 
dissent’s view of this case, the IJ’s behavior falls far short of the level 
of decorum necessary to impart a sense of reliability in the result. 
Thus, under a contamination theory, the demeanor factor would favor 
remand. 
 
2. Internally Inconsistent 
 
When immigration judges conduct their adverse credibility 
determination analyses, they frequently rely upon internal 
inconsistencies to discredit the testimony.226 Similarly, if an IJ is 
internally inconsistent in terms of what is required of the asylum 
applicant, courts should consider the reliability of the IJs rulings to be 
undermined. Internal inconsistency in IJ decisions presents itself as the 
impossibility of satisfying the IJ’s evidentiary requirements. This 
factor may be satisfied where the IJ requires supporting documents for 
certain portions of the asylum applicant’s testimony but 
simultaneously rejects the supporting evidence that same type of 
document when produced for other portions of the testimony.  
Letters from home are one frequent way in which asylum 
applicants try to corroborate their claims. Some letters will function 
more like affidavits and describe the persecutory behavior expressly, 
but most will discuss persecution tangentially. For example, asylum 
applicants have submitted letters indicating whether it would be safe to 
return,227 whether the applicant’s friends back in their home countries 
were killed,228 or whether others were under surveillance or were 
arrested.229 However, when submitted, these types of letters are 
                                                 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 887. 
226 See, e.g., Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that an applicant’s claims “may be so internally inconsistent or implausible on its 
face that a reasonable fact-finder would not credit it”). 
227 Oyekunle v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2007).  
228 Tchemkou v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir. 2007).  
229 Gebreeyesus v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 952, 954 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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frequently discounted by IJs on the grounds that they were written by 
family members who would write anything,230 were not specific 
enough,231 or otherwise deserved little weight.  
In Afi Marie’s case, the IJ wanted some sort of evidence from 
listeners of her husband’s radio station in Togo or evidence from 
former employees of her husband’s garbage collection company.232 
When she could not provide either type of letter, the IJ presumed that 
her husband must not have held waste disposal contracts and must not 
have had a radio station at all, even despite the fact that Afi Marie also 
submitted a photo of her husband at the station.233  
What is perhaps the most baffling in the IJ’s treatment of the 
documentary evidence is that, when Afi Marie provided letters from 
her cousins that her home had been looted and from her father that the 
authorities were looking for her, the IJ deems the letters as deserving 
little weight.234 He criticizes one letter as not being specific enough, 
while the other one as containing apparent “exaggerations.”235 This is 
an evidentiary game that seems impossible for asylum applicants to 
win. 
The impossibility of satisfying the IJ in this case is further 
exemplified by the treatment of the other witnesses in this case. The IJ 
                                                 
230 Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006). The asylum 
applicant had his family mail his father’s death certificate to him to support his 
applicant’s claim. The IJ expressed his concerns as to the authenticity of such a 
document by asking, “Well, sir, if you asked for a certificate saying that you’re the 
president of Bangladesh, would they send you something?” Id. 
231 Adekpe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2007). Although the 
asylum applicant in this case submitted corroborating letters from his family, the IJ 
found them insufficient because they did not “corroborate the incidents that occurred 
specifically to him.” Id. 
232 Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 897 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, 
J., dissenting). 
233 Id. 
234 Decision of the Immigration Judge at 11-12, In the Matter of Afi Marie 
Apouviepseakoda, Immigration Court, Chicago, Illinois, (June 14, 2004), available 
at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, search for case No. 05-3752, follow 
“05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_002.pdf” link).  
235 Id. 
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noted that it was already 6:45pm and that “there’s only so much time 
that the Court can grant to you.”236 In the interests of time, the IJ stated 
that he would accept an offer of proof regarding the testimony of the 
Apouviepseakoda family friend and Afi Marie’s daughter.237 The 
family friend was also a refugee of Togo who began working with a 
Canadian organization that documented Togolese abuses.238 In 
addition, this witness also had direct, personal knowledge on the 
participation and support of the Apouviepseakoda family for the 
opposition party.239 If the IJ accepted the offer of proof, as he stated 
that he would, the inconsistencies questioning Afi Marie’s and her 
husband’s affiliation with the opposition party should have dissolved. 
Yet, despite the IJ’s acceptance of the offer of proof, this witness’ 
testimony was ignored and the alleged inconsistencies remained. 
The second witness who would have testified, were it not for the 
IJ, was Afi Marie’s daughter.240 She was going to testify to the beating 
that she saw the Togolese soldiers inflict upon her mother.241 If the IJ 
is going to accept the offer of proof, he should have considered the 
fact that Afi Marie's daughter would have provided testimony 
consistent with Afi Marie’s. This would have been a crucial point of 
corroborating testimony—one that the IJ frequently complained was 
lacking in Afi Marie’s asylum claim242—but the ability of the offers of 
                                                 
236 Brief of Petitioner at 19, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (No. 05-3752), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, 
search for case No. 05-3752, follow “05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_001.pdf” 
link). 
237 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 888 (majority opinion). 
238 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 70, at 19-20. 
239 Id. at 20. 
240 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 888. 
241 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 70, at 19. 
242 See, e.g., Decision of the Immigration Judge at 5, In the Matter of Afi Marie 
Apouviepseakoda, Immigration Court, Chicago, Illinois, (June 14, 2004), available 
at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, search for case No. 05-3752, follow 
“05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_002.pdf” link) (discussing photos and medical 
certificate). 
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proof to rehabilitate and corroborate Afi Marie’s testimony did not 
figure into the IJ's calculus.  
Afi Marie’s daughter would have provided a second point of 
corroborating testimony that the IJ complained was missing. The 
daughter would have been able to provide precisely that information 
that the IJ wanted: 
 
Q: Do we have any license from the government of 
Togo authorizing your husband to operate a station in 
Togo? 
A. Yes, we had documents, but as I was leaving Lome I 
had difficulties and I couldn’t collect all the documents. 
Q. I see you have some documents here, but does this 
mean that this is an operating business or how do I 
know this was not a station that was expected to go on 
line and needed completion before it did so? 
A. Well, you can ask my, my daughter. 
Q. I see. Well, would I expect your daughter to 
contradict you? And how, how ---this radio station, can 
you tell me what it’s potential to reach the public? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what, what – did it have a regular schedule 
operation? 
A. Yes, the radio has a schedule. 
Q. And how did the public understand when to tune in 
to this radio station? 
A. If you turn your radio on, turn your radio on 97.5 or 
you hear the radio. 
Q. I see. Now this radio station 95 – 97.5, well, how, 
how – was there any programming, any, any circulation 
of scheduling for the general public so they know when 
to tune in to hear any particular programming? 
A. This I, yes, there was a schedule circulated, but since 
I was not involved in, in that business I, I really can’t 
tell you how they were circulated. All I know is that my 
husband had a functioning radio station. 
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Q. I see. Do we have anything to verify that that was 
true other than your statements? 
A. I have a photo. 
Q. I see. I see a photo too. I have photographs also in 
high school where I took pictures with a radio 
transmitter there. Does that mean that that is an 
operating business because you have a photograph? 
A. I couldn’t gather all the paper, all the documents 
together. It’s necessary to ask my child. 
Q. To wit, ma’am, I don’t want to hear the question ask 
my child because your child is not going to be the 
confirming information for the Court.243 
 
Afi Marie consistently and repeatedly admitted that she knew very 
little about this business.244 The daughter would have testified that the 
radio station did exist and that her father was indeed the owner.245 But, 
even after the IJ accepted the offer of proof regarding the daughter’s 
testimony, the IJ’s skepticism regarding the operational status of the 
radio station remained. The impossibility of satisfying the IJ’s 
evidentiary demands was clear. Afi Marie had the very evidence that 
the IJ was looking for, but when she presented it, it was always 
somehow insufficient. 
 
3. Corroboration (Arguing Outside the Record) 
 
When invoked, the corroboration requirement demands that 
asylum applicants be able to bolster their claims with documentary 
evidence.246 Similarly, when an IJ’s adverse credibility determination 
is being challenged for bias, reviewing courts should examine the 
extent to which an IJ forms conclusions based upon evidence not in 
the record on appeal. Typically, IJ opinions that lack such 
                                                 
243 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 70, at 17-18. 
244 Id.  
245 Id. at 19. 
246 Gontcharova v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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corroboration rely upon the personal experiences of the IJ to draw 
conclusions from the asylum applicant’s testimony.247 The problem 
with IJs relying upon personal experience, or what they perceive as 
“common sense,” is that what is common in the United States is not 
necessarily common in a foreign culture.248 The problem with 
reviewing a biased IJ’s decision is that the reviewing court will be 
tempted in to looking for ways to show that the IJ wasn’t that far off. 
This leads to the incorporation of unsupported assumptions of the IJ.  
On several occasions, the Seventh Circuit majority’s analysis 
becomes this sort of fact-finding foray. The IJ found two problems 
with the signed medical certificate that Afi Marie submitted. First, the 
IJ noted that the physician saw Afi Marie “in consultation” as opposed 
to having been her treating physician.249 The IJ explained, “some 
injuries are a result of a complication because of preexisting condition 
and the treating doctor would have that information in his report.”250 
Apparently, the IJ was concerned that, to the extent that Afi Marie was 
being treated for legitimate injuries, it may have been due to an 
automobile accident.251 However, nothing in the record suggests that 
there was ever any car accident.252 There is similarly nothing in the 
record to suggest that treating physicians in Togo would have 
information different than what consulting physicians in Togo would 
have.253 The IJ’s reliance upon this distinction to discredit Afi Marie’s 
testimony should be construed as evidence of a tainted adverse 
credibility determination. 
                                                 
247 See e.g., Jiang v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 2007). 
248 As Judge Posner notes in his dissent, “Most asylum applicants come from 
distant, poor, and poorly governed countries about which Americans, including the 
immigration judges, who are not selected for their knowledge of foreign countries, 
know nothing.” Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 898 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Posner, J., dissenting). 
249 Id. at 895. 
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Second, the physician who signed Afi Marie’s medical certificate 
specialized in ‘‘Gynecology–Obstetrics, General Medicine.”254 The IJ 
ignores the “General Medicine” portion of the title to find that it was 
inconsistent for Afi Marie to have been treated for serious bodily 
injuries by an Ob-Gyn.255 The Seventh Circuit took this a step further 
when it noted that Afi Marie’s initial visit to the doctor was in April 
which happened to be the same month she visited the doctor when she 
returned to Togo: “This April visit to a gynecologist prompts us to note 
a coincidence not recognized by the IJ.”256 This newly noted 
coincidence is problematic for the same reason that IJs are so strictly 
confined to the evidence in their records. The Seventh Circuit 
majority’s intimation presumes to understand common medical 
practice amongst Togolese doctors and patients. The record is certainly 
silent as to whether Togolese woman have adopted the practice of 
obtaining an annual examination by the gynecologists. And there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that Afi Marie could not go to the 
same hospital for trauma as for a gynecological exam. Finally, the IJ’s 
characterization of the second trip to the Togo hospital as being 
elective is entirely irrational. If Afi Marie simply needed to have a 
gynecological exam, why would she not have waited until she returned 
to the medical system of the United States? There must have been 
some reason for her to see a doctor there. Her attendance to her 
medical health should not be construed as an inconsistency, 
particularly where there is nothing in the record to support the IJ’s or 
the Seventh Circuit’s explanation.  
 
4. Plausibility (logic) 
 
Even if the asylum applicant’s claim is internally consistent and 
supported through documentary evidence, the IJ may make an adverse 
                                                 
254 Id. at 891 n.6 (majority opinion). 
255 Id. at 895 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
256 Id. at 891 n.6 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original). 
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credibility determination on the basis of implausibility.257 
Analogously, where the IJ’s decision is being challenged for bias, 
reviewing courts should look to the plausibility of the reasons for the 
IJ’s adverse credibility determination. In other words, courts should 
look simply to whether the IJ is being logical. 
In Afi Marie’s case, Judge Posner describes the logical pitfalls in 
the IJ’s decision as “yawning chasms.”258 The biggest obstacle for the 
IJ seems to be the numbers stamped on the Lome hospitalization 
photos. Each of the two photographs submitted by Afi Marie had the 
numbers “03 4 16” on them,259 with the “03” portion being more 
difficult to make out than the other numbers.260 The IJ asked whether 
the numbers meant that the photos were taken on April 16, 2003—a 
problematic date given that her hospitalization occurred in 2001 and 
her asylum application was filed in 2002.261 Afi Marie could only 
respond, “I think it’s just a date because I wasn’t in Lome in the year 
2003.”262 Furthermore, Judge Posner notes that the IJ did not question 
the fact that the photos were submitted with the rest of the 2002 
asylum application.263 Given the date Afi Marie submitted her 
materials, it is simply implausible that the numbers represent a date.264 
The IJ’s insistence, in the face of this apparent inconsistency, should 




It is far from clear whether Afi Marie qualifies for asylum. But 
what is clear is that her adverse credibility determination was tainted 
                                                 
257 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006); Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
258 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 897 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
259 Id. at 896. 
260 Id. at 890 (majority opinion). 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 896 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
264 Id. 
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with bias. Her petition for review should have been granted with 
instructions to remand to a new immigration judge. Because the 
adverse credibility determination completely incapacitates the asylum 
claim, courts should be more cautious in the amount of bias that they 
tolerate on review. The four factors of IJ bias in an adverse credibility 
setting proposed in this note are by no means exhaustive. And by no 
means would all four factors need be present to warrant remand.  
The current safeguards against pre-decision and IJ bias detect too 
few decisions that should be vacated. Where IJ bias reaches a level 
sufficient for reversal on due process considerations, a reviewing court 
would easily be able to reverse on a challenge to the adverse 
credibility determination itself. The contamination theory applies in 
those instances where the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is not 
as patently incorrect. Where the IJ is denying an asylum applicant’s 
claim not on the merits, but on the basis of an adverse credibility 
determination, the threshold tolerance for bias should be low. This is 
the only way that we can rely upon the findings of fact from a system 
where the usual aids in detecting truth are unavailable.  
Because the denial of an asylum application can literally be a 
matter of life and death, the immigration system should strive to 
minimize the number of denials to deserving applicants. To the extent 
that some error is unavoidable, the immigration system should err on 
the side of caution.  
42
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